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Abstract 
The Future Combat System (FCS) program is, without a doubt, the most 
challenging modernization program ever attempted by the Army.  The requirement 
defines the need to develop and field a fully integrated system-of-systems consisting 
of manned ground vehicles, unmanned ground systems, and unmanned aerial 
systems—all connected by a complex network.  The program is in its fifth year of 
System Development and Demonstration.  Despite two restructures, due to 
reprioritizations of dollars within the Army and budget cuts imposed by Congress, 
the program remains on schedule to deliver capability to the current force in 2010 
and, by 2017, to field a fully equipped FCS brigade combat team.  To date, most 
articles, studies, and reports on FCS have focused on the complexities of the task of 
developing and fielding a system-of-systems and on the unique contractual 
arrangement between the Army and the program’s lead system integrator.  This 
paper provides early lessons learned from the FCS program that may be useful to 
acquisition professionals facing the challenges of managing the complexity inherent 
in 21st-century Department of Defense programs.       
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Executive Summary 
The Army’s Future Combat Systems program is generating many lessons 
learned.  This paper attempts to capture three of them: (1) selecting the appropriate 
contractual arrangement with industry for a complex program, (2) developing an 
appropriate management relationship, and (3) establishing a truly integrated test 
organization.  
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Introduction 
A web search on the FCS program provides over 1.45 million hits.  The 
majority of them focus on the advanced warfighting capabilities enabled by the 
advanced technologies of the program, though this number also includes numerous 
papers and reports about the execution of the program and the concept/performance 
of the Lead Systems Integrator.  The search produces very little about the fact that 
the program is progressing very well and is, after four-plus years, on-cost and within 
schedule.  The program’s official June 2007 Cost Performance Report shows a cost 
performance index of 100% and a schedule performance index of 99.2% (FCS, 
2007, June 1-June 28).  Three recent press releases also support the previous 
statement.  The first two pertain to the family of manned ground combat systems.  
They announce the decision to build the lead manned combat vehicle system, the 
Non-line-of-sight Cannon, at Elgin, Oklahoma, beginning in 2010 (Boeing, 2007, 
August 8), and the successful demonstration of the common hybrid electric drive 
system for the entire family of vehicles (BAE Systems, 2007, August 15).  The third, 
and probably the most important, sign of progress is the announcement of the 
successful completion of FCS Experiment 1.1.  The experiment was designed to 
conduct a live-fire exercise with FCS technologies, such as “urban and tactical 
unattended ground sensors and unmanned vehicles,” linked by an advanced 
network (Army News Service, 2007, February 2).  “The future is now,“ stated MG 
Charles Cartwright, the FCS Program Manager. “Today’s exercise is further 
confirmation that the FCS program is working as planned” (2007, February 2).   
The integration requirements of the FCS program reflect the general 
movement of 21st-century Department of Defense programs toward a greater degree 
of complexity.  Therefore, the early successes of the FCS program may provide 
useful lessons learned to other complex programs—either those currently in the 
research and development phase or those about to get started.  This paper focuses 
on a subset of the many emerging lessons learned from the FCS program, with the 
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intent of making the information available to current and future program mangers of 
complex systems so they can benefit from the FCS experience.  
Drawn from the researcher’s own personal experiences with the program and 
from discussions with the current program leadership, this paper will highlight three 
main areas contributing to the early successes of the program: (1) establishment of 
an appropriate contractual relationship with industry tailored to the requirements of 
the program, (2) development of a program management structure that enables the 
successful execution of FCS and (3) establishment of an enabling test structure.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide lessons learned on how/why these three 
strategies were developed and to gain some insight into the internal Army processes 
that led to their development. 
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Determining the Appropriate Contractual 
Arrangement for FCS 
Background 
The most recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) was directed by Congress to examine “the 
participation and activities of the Lead Systems Integrator in the Future Combat 
Systems (FCS) program under the contract of the Army for the Future Combat 
Systems” (GAO, 2006, sec. a).  The GAO report recognizes “that the scope and 
complexity of the FCS system-of-systems creates a business relationship that is not 
typical of other weapon system acquisitions” (GAO, 2007, June, p. 4).  The purpose 
of this section of the paper is to provide the true rationale behind the Army’s decision 
to use a Lead Systems Integrator on the FCS program and to explain why it was the 
right choice.  In fact, FCS may prove to be the only program of record in which such 
a unique contractual arrangement is the correct relationship between the 
government and industry. 
The GAO report states the rationale for pursuing a Lead Systems Integrator 
(LSI) in the FCS program was that “The Army determined that with its existing 
acquisition workforce and organizations, it did not have the agility, capability, or 
capacity to manage the program without an LSI to assist with certain aspects of 
program management”  (2007, June, p. 6).  In addition, the report explains:  
The Army determined it could not meet the challenges of the FCS scope and 
accelerated schedule with its workforce alone and with traditional 
management approaches. Army leadership saw its workforce as stovepiped 
into organizations having areas of expertise that were not a full match for 
what FCS needed and not large enough with the right skills to staff several 
separate program offices. (2007, June, p. 7)   
Although there was much discussion about the ability of the acquisition 
workforce to properly manage and deliver FCS, that issue certainly was not the 
deciding factor in the selection of the LSI arrangement. 
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Contrary to popular belief, the FCS program did not start with a SDD contract 
in May of 2003.  In 1998, the Army was being pressured to transform into a force 
more appropriate for the emerging challenges of the 21st Century.  The emerging 
lessons learned from the Balkans (as well as from other circumstances throughout 
the post-Cold War world) were beginning to influence the thinking of the Army’s 
Training and Doctrine Command about both near-term and future operations and the 
capabilities the Army would require to fulfill its mission.  Simultaneously, the Army 
entered into an agreement with the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA); this agreement served to invite the defense industry to offer its ideas on 
both the structure of a future Army brigade designed to meet the emerging threats, 
as well as the technologies necessary to support revolutionary warfighting 
capabilities—including unmanned ground and aerial systems.  This initiative led to 
contracts with four industry teams. The general timeline envisioned was to provide 
the new capability by 2015 to 2020.  In the meantime, Army transformation for the 
near-term was defined in October 1999 by the now-established Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team concept, which was outlined in context of the broader vision of the 
Army’s Objective Force (Objective Force Task Force, 2007).  Then, the Bush 
Administration took office in January 2000 and made military transformation a 
priority; at that point, pressure was exerted on the Army to move more quickly to 
define its future. 
The vision of a FCS-based unit (to be completed by the end of 2010) was laid 
out in a speech by the Chief of Staff of the Army in October 2000. This was really a 
further clarification of the Army’s road to the Objective Force. The new concept was 
to be the next material and unit redesign step beyond the Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team toward the Army’s Objective Force. The FCS program was to leverage the 
work of the DARPA/Army initiative started in 1998.  The work on the program now 
known as the FCS Brigade Combat Team began immediately after the speech. 
The Beginning of the Lead Systems Integrator Concept 
Beginning in the late fall of 2000, the Training and Doctrine Command, under 
the leadership of General John Abrams, began the difficult task of defining the 
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requirement for an FCS Brigade Combat Team.  The document would go through 
many iterations; the first Statement of Required Capabilities was ready in November 
of 2001 (Schenk, 2001, November 8-9).  This document would form the basis of the 
current FCS requirements document. 
Concurrently, in the spring and summer of 2001, the Objective Force Task 
Force, under the leadership of LTG John Riggs, began to work with the 
DARPA/Army team toward fielding the initial FCS capabilities as early as 2008.  The 
Army leadership also approached leaders in the defense industry for their ideas. 
As a result, the first concept of a Lead Systems Integrator for FCS came in 
the early summer of 2001 from one of the defense industry companies working 
under the DARPA/Army FCS contract in the form of an unsolicited briefing—laying 
out the “why” and the “how” for such an unusual contractual arrangement.  The 
“why” focused on industry’s ability to manage the complex integration of required 
new technologies for manned and unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, as well as 
the integration of advanced networking capabilities.  The “how” suggested the 
defense company become the program’s lead system integrator. 
The contractor was directed to make its presentation to the Program 
Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS).  The PEO would 
become responsible for the FCS program upon its transition from the DARPA/Army 
contract to an Army-only contract tentatively for the Spring of 2003.  The Program 
Executive Officer, the author of this paper, had never heard of such a contractual 
arrangement.  His experience was limited to prime contractor contractual 
arrangements.  Little did he know at the time that the Army leadership had 
tentatively accepted the concept of a Lead Systems Integrator.  In the meantime, he 
set up a series of meetings with the Missile Defense Agency and the International 
Space Station program to understand their contractual relationship with their 
perspective Lead Systems Integrator.  Over the next two years, many of the lessons 
learned from the Missile Defense Agency and the International Space Station 
program would be applied to the Army’s Lead Systems Integrator concept.  The two 
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most important lessons were as follows: ensure the requirement, when finalized, 
supports the need for such a contractual arrangement and that the associated 
contractor/management structure is well thought-out—with responsibilities clearly 
defined in advance of signing the contract.   
In September 2001, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff 
approved, based on recommendations from the Objective Force Task Force, the 
Army Staff, the Army Secretariat, and the Training and Doctrine Command, the 
following (Schenk, 2001, August):  
1. Accelerate FCS to MSB in April 2003 
2. Solicit for a LSI 
3. Put an AAC GO in charge  
Based on Recommendation 2 above, the Program Executive Officer and his 
staff had approximately 18 months to follow the progression of the requirement and 
to work on the management concept.  Meanwhile, the newly assigned Brigadier 
General Program Manager began to work with the DARPA/Army team to transition 
its program to a Concept Development and Technology phase. This was to be 
completed under a single contractor or contractor team that could potentially 
become the Lead Systems Integrator at the Milestone B decision. 
A competition was held under DARPA leadership; the Boeing Company was 
chosen to take the program through the Concept Development and Technology 
phase.  The contract was awarded on the March 14, 2002.  Although there were 
numerous tasks to be performed, the most important for the purposes of this paper 




The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for requirements 
determination, development, analysis and documentation. The LSI will provide support to 
TRADOC as required for the definition of the operational requirements and organizational 
design for the Unit of Action (UoA) in the UoA O&O plan, establishment of the Operational 
Architecture within which the FCS-equipped Unit of Action operates, and defining the system 
of systems elements and their capabilities in the FCS Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD).  The LSI will support TRADOC to develop the System Training Analysis Plan (STRAP), 
analyze training needs and requirements and provide recommendations for training products 
and processes.  These projects and process will encompass institutional, individual and unit 
training for soldiers and leaders.  TRADOC will provide each published draft version of all 
requirements documents, in accordance with the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan, to 
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the LSI during the requirements development process to ensure concurrent materiel 
development and concept/technology demonstration activities are performed IAW user 
requirements.   The LSI, in support of TRADOC, will assist in developing those documents as 
well as assist in assessment, analysis, war-gaming, and evolution of requirements throughout 
the program life cycle.  This includes support for the alternative analyses of military worth 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).  The LSI is responsible for ensuring requirements traceability to 
the source documents as described in Concept Development above. 
 
Table 1. FCS Contract 
(Boeing, 2002, March 14) 
 
Contrary to many reports on the FCS program, the LSI was never responsible 
for the requirements document.  As stated above, the work accomplished by 
TRADOC, with support from the LSI, was going to be a key factor in determining the 
continued need for a LSI beyond the Concept Development and Technology phase. 
The Requirement, Confirmation of the Need for a Lead Systems 
Integrator 
As previously stated, the initial DARPA/Army competition to select a potential 
Lead Systems Integrator was supported by a Statement of Required Capabilities 
(SORC), not an Operational Requirements Document (ORD).  Although the SORC 
sustained the decision by the Army leadership to plan on using a LSI, the final 
decision would be part of the Milestone B decision.  The acquisition professionals 
now in charge of the development and acquisition of FCS understood the need for 
the ORD to justify such a departure from the accepted prime/government contractual 
arrangement.  In fact, the newly assigned PM for FCS sent a cautionary note to both 
the acquisition leadership and the Objective Force Task Force on rushing into a 
decision on the LSI concept.  He stated, “I caution that because the differences 
between an LSI and a prime with Total Systems Performance Responsibility are 
vague, it will be difficult to gain consensus on its added value to the effort” (Schenk, 
2001, August 25).  He further added, “[I]t seems to me that it is incumbent on 
TRADOC to deliver the needed pieces of the requirements generation process to 
allow the programs to proceed to the leadership’s desired pace” (2001, August 25). 
The TRADOC effort began in earnest in the fall of 2001.  The acquisition 
community strongly supported the entire process.  In many instances, community 
members’ input was inserted directly into the emerging ORD.  In June of 2002, the 
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commander of TRADOC held a week-long session with all of his leaders.  Once 
again, the acquisition community was well-represented.  And once again, its 
members’ input was utilized by the TRADOC team.  The results of that week clearly 
identified the need for a Lead Systems Integrator for the FCS program.  The exact 
nature of the contract would not be evident for approximately 15 months, but its 
scope was beginning to take shape.   
The chart below depicts TRADOC’s final ORD: 
 
Figure 1. FCS Family of Systems ORD Structure  
(United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003, April 14, Figure 1.1-3) 
Another way to view the requirement is shown in Figure 2 below.   
 - 9 - 
1Approved for public release, distribution unlimited, GOVT  Case #  07-7015, 06 February 2007  
FCS Brigade Combat Team...









FCS Recovery and 
Maintenance 
Vehicle (FRMV)
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
Class I UAV Class IV UAV
Unattended Ground Systems (UGS)
Tactical and Urban 
Unattended
Ground Sensors
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)
Small UGV (SUGV)
Armed Robotic 

























6 Feb 07  
Figure 2. FCS Brigade Combat Team 
(FCS, 2007, February 6) 
Figure 2 captures the current program’s baseline and differs slightly from 
Figure 1.  But, the majority of the requirement has remained unchanged since 
Milestone B.  
For those readers not familiar with traditional ORDs, the structure of FCS is 
very unique. It describes the requirement (refer to Figure 1) for a system-of-systems 
whose parts are subservient to the requirements identified in Annexes A ( Battle 
Command C4ISR) through I (Classified).  The system-of-system annexes had 
approximately 535 specified requirements; these were meant to flow down to the 
piece parts (such as Combat Systems, shown in the blue boxes).  The other major 
distinguishing feature is its Complimentary Systems (identified in the entire green, 
shaded area).  For the first time, other systems being developed outside of the 
program were now tied directly to FCS.  It was now obvious to the majority of 
acquisition leaders that an unique contractual arrangement with an industry partner 
would be necessary to deliver the warfighting capability described in the FCS 
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Family-of-systems ORD Structure.  Immediately after the discussion week in June, 
plans began to take shape in earnest to structure a very distinctive contractual 
arrangement with the DARPA/Army-chosen LSI.  As a side note, the LSI approach 
also required program leadership to think through the roles of government in this 
unique relationship and determine how the government could maintain both strong 
management and oversight functions. The final two sections of the paper will 
continue to discuss those roles.  
Lessons Learned 
(1) The complexity and costs associated with most major acquisition 
programs in the Department of Defense require a close working 
relationship between the requirements and acquisition 
communities from day one.  Every day the program proceeds 
without it will eventually lead to cost and schedule delays and will 
potentially negatively influence overall expected system 
performance.   
(2) Complexity also requires a tailored approach to the type of 
contractual arrangement between government and industry. The 
contract must be structured to meet the requirements of the 
program as articulated in the requirements document.  Classic, 
prime relationships will normally be sufficient, but management 
should never close the door to other types of relationships—
including the use of a Lead Systems Integrator.  The FCS 
requirement demanded such a “tailored” LSI approach.  No other 
consideration (such as the competency of the government 
workforce) should influence the approach selected.  The nature of 
the requirement should be the only factor considered in the 
decision process.  As will be discussed later, the roles of 
government and industry can then be defined. 
(3) It is incumbent upon the acquisition community to leverage 
lessons learned from similar programs already in existence at the 
very startup of a new program.  It is the author’s experience that 
acquisition professionals are somewhat reluctant to talk amongst 
themselves.  Maybe this is because we have historically worked 
with programs which did not require integration across functional 
areas, or that we saw low-tech Army ground programs having 
little or nothing in common with Air Force, Navy, or large DoD 
programs.  In most major programs, those days of low-tech are 
over.  The lessons passed on by the Missile Defense Agency and 
the International Space Station leaders were invaluable to the 
acquisition leaders of FCS.   
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Establishing an Enabling Program Management 
Structure 
The second element in Section 115 of the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007 directs the Comptroller General to provide: “a 
description and assessment of the responsibilities of the Army in managing the 
Future Combat Systems program, including oversight of the activities of the Lead 
Systems Integrator and the decisions made by the Lead Systems Integrator” (The 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency Senate Armed Services Committee, 
2006, para. (b)(2)).  Although the report responding to Section 115 includes 
concerns about the management arrangement (primarily regarding potential conflicts 
between the partnering of the Army with the LSI and the Army’s oversight function), 
it makes no recommendations to alter the relationship (GAO, 2007, June, p. 27).  
The purpose of this section of the paper is to provide information on the early steps 
taken by the government and contractor to lay the foundation for an effective 
program-management structure and partnering relationship. 
As stated earlier, the competition for the original selection of the FCS Lead 
Systems Integrator was held by the DARPA/ARMY program.  There was active 
participation by the Army—both in the Request for Proposal preparation and the 
source-selection process. However, once the contract was drafted, two things had to 
occur simultaneously to make the Milestone B date of April 2003.  First of all, the 
chosen contractor team of Boeing and its subcontractor, SAIC, had to satisfy the 
terms and conditions of the Concept and Technology Development-phase contract 
with DARPA. Secondly, the team had to concurrently begin working with the 
designated Army PEO/PM team that would take over at Milestone B.  The 
Department has historically struggled with transitioning much less challenging 
programs from the technology base to the program-management world, let alone a 
program based on a unique system-of-systems requirement and with a relatively 
unusual Lead Systems Integrator relationship vice a classic prime contractor. This 
was, indeed, a challenging situation. 
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The PEO/PM team began to meet in the summer of 2002 to think through 
how it would build an appropriate government/LSI management structure to meet 
the cost, schedule, and performance parameters of the FCS System-of-systems 
program.  By August of that summer, the team was prepared to make its first 
decision briefing to the Army Acquisition Executive on its proposed approach and 
the issues associated with it.  The briefing covered not only the proposed framework 
of the PM shop and its responsibilities, but the recommended role of all Army PEOs, 
the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Army’s Test and Evaluation 
Command, the Army Material Command’s Research and Development Command,  
TRADOC and, finally,  DARPA—the organization then currently in charge of the 
program.  With minor exceptions, the majority of the plan was approved.  Now the 
hard work of deciphering the duties and responsibilities of the LSI could begin. 
A meeting was scheduled through the DARPA/Army project manager 
between the PEO GCS and representatives of the LSI management team.  The only 
guidance to them was to present what they thought their scope as the Army’s LSI 
would be, as well as what management and oversight they anticipated would come 
from the government.  Unfortunately, to the government representatives, it was 
obvious that the LSI envisioned its role as a very large prime contractor.  The 
meeting ended with both sides knowing that some guidance needed to be 
established; only then could the leaders of both parties give some direction to the 
perspective personnel to guide them both in structuring the roles of the LSI and the 
System Development and Design phase, as well as in laying the foundation for the 
role of both after Milestone C.   
After that first meeting, the leaders of both organizations decided that a group 
of guiding principles (or program tenets) were necessary to provide the basis upon 
which the workforces could build a contractual relationship and management 
structure.  The tenets below are the  fruits of that decision.  Early in its reply to the 
Section 115, the GAO states:  
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The Army established a number of key tenets that it wanted to achieve on the 
FCS program, in partnership with the LSI. They include:  
 create opportunity for best of industry to participate;  
 leverage government technology base to maximum extent;  
 associate ongoing enabling efforts with LSI-led activity;  
 maintain a collaborative environment from design through life-cycle;  
 as a minimum, achieve commonality at subsystem/component level;  
 design/plan for technology integration and insertion;  
 maintain and shape the industrial base for the future;  
 retain competition throughout future force acquisition;  
 have appropriate government involvement in procurement processes;  
 achieve consistent and continuous definition of requirements;  
 maintain and shape government acquisition community;  
 achieve program affordability—balance performance and sustainment; 
and  
 have a “one team” operating with partnership and teamwork. (2007, 
June, p. 5)  
Unfortunately, the GAO failed to do more than mention the tenets in its report; 
yet, these tenets became the foundation for the contract as well as the management 
relationships that exist today between the all government players and the Lead 
Systems Integrator.   
Their importance to the program has been evident since they were 
established. For example, as a result of the tenet, “create opportunity for the best of 
industry to participate,” all major subcontractors on the program were competitively 
selected by a combined LSI/government team, with the Army’s Acquisition Executive 
as the final approval authority.  This is one major area that separates a LSI from a 
prime contract.  The LSI members build/provide little, if anything, for the program 
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unless it is competitively awarded. (Footnote: There is one exception to this tenet 
that was awarded under the DARPA/Army contract with concurrence of the Army.)  
Another example of the critical nature of the above-listed tenets was the 
noncompetitive selection of General Dynamics and United Defense as the manned 
ground vehicle integrating team as a result of the tenet to “maintain and shape the 
industrial base of the future.”  As these corporations were the providers of all the 
Army’s current inventory of manned combat platforms, government management 
made the decision to maintain that portion of the base. Yet, it demanded competition 
at the manned ground vehicle major subsystem level to bring new, high-tech 
suppliers into the business.   
The above tenets are alive and well in the program today.  In a recent 
interview with the Army and LSI program managers, they stated that the tenets 
established at the outset of the government and LSI relationship are the baseline 
that government and LSI leaders still follow today.  The tenets focus the leadership 
on management of the program, not the contract (Cartwright & Muilenburg, 2007, 
August 21).  These managers further state that the successful and timely 
restructurings of the program since 2003 (due to the Army’s changing priorities, the 
impact of the war on Army near-term requirements, and Congressional cuts) would 
not have been possible without the partnering relationship that exists between the 
Army and the LSI. The above tenets set the foundation for both (2007, August 21). 
Lessons Learned  
(1) The leaders of the FCS program office realized from the time they 
were given the acquisition lead that program success was only 
possible with the support of the entire acquisition community.  
From day one, the planning for Milestone B and beyond was 
effected in collaboration with strategic partners—including all 
Army PEOs, the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command, the 
Defense Contract Management Agency, the Army’s Research and 
Development Command and the Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command.  The initial decision briefing to the Army Acquisition 
Executive was truly a team effort.  Along the way, additional team 
members were added to include representatives from the OSD 
staff, DOTE, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, and, yes, 
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even the Government Accountability Office. Sometimes, 
acquisition professionals forget that the building and executing of 
programs are team sports.  The early successes of the FCS 
program are proof of the value of teaming early in the process.   
(2) Rather than rushing into a contractual and management 
relationship with a defense contractor, acquisition community 
members should spend significant time determining together 
what both sides consider to be important for program success.  
As the FCS program team learned from visiting the Missile 
Defense Agency and the International Space Station, a lack of 
upfront understanding between the program’s participants as to 
the role of the government in a Lead Systems Integrator 
relationship resulted in duplication of effort and, eventually, major 
contractual and program issues.  The FCS program attempted to 
mitigate the confusion of program participants’ roles and 
responsibilities by first establishing agreed-to tenets that both 
sides decided were important for program success.  Although the 
FCS program has a LSI, this lesson applies to all types of 
contractual relationships.   
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Establishing an Enabling Test Organization 
The latest GAO report states:   
The LSI has a lead role in developmental testing and verification of technical 
requirements throughout FCS development. For the FCS program, testing 
and evaluation of system prototypes will be managed through a combined 
test organization co-led by the LSI and the Army and made of up 
representatives of the LSI, Army Test and Evaluation Command and the 
Army’s FCS program management office. (GAO, 2007, June, p. 14)    
The truth is, the LSI has a major role in testing (as does any prime contractor), yet 
the organization responsible for testing is the FCS program’s Combined Test 
Organization (CTO).  For the Army, the CTO is a unique organization. It was 
organized during the DARPA/ARMY CDT phase of the program to formulate the 
entire test strategy (including hardware and software) from early developmental 
through operational testing.  The charter for the CTO states:   
The CTO will have the authority and responsibility for management of all FCS 
system level combined DT/OT Tests.  The CTO will integrate, coordinate, and 
plan (on a broad scope) combined developmental and operational testing in 
accordance with the FCS acquisition strategy and the Test and Evaluation 
Master Plan (TEMP).  The CTO will act as the single integration team for 
system level testing.  System tests under CTO cognizance include: 
Production Qualification Tests (PQTs), Production Verification Tests (PVTs), 
Live Fire Test & Evaluation (LFT&E), and some Specialty Tests.  The LSI and 
its subcontractors will execute a portion of the developmental testing and 
support operational testing in accordance with the terms of the contracts, 
Army regulations, and the terms of this charter. (Director CTO, p. 1)  
Similar to the contractual arrangement and the management structure, the 
concept of an organization, rather than a traditional test directorate, was once again 
dictated by the requirements document.  Historically, single-system testing is difficult 
enough, but the added complexity of system-of-systems requirements (including the 
network, etc.) forced the acquisition and test community leaders to think creatively.  
The task of creating a test program was made somewhat easier because of 
the planning and execution for the Army’s Stryker program.  The Stryker program 
was the Army’s first attempt at developing and fielding a family of combat systems to 
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support the concept of an infantry-centric mobile brigade combat team.  It did not 
have the complexity of FCS because the basic vehicle was military off-the-shelf, and 
most of the major subsystems were already integrated on other Army platforms.  In 
addition, Stryker integrated the tactical network already in use by the Army—except 
the Stryker Brigade required a more robust version.  
As stated earlier, the PEO GCS was given the responsibility for the FCS 
program.  The PEO GCS was also responsible for the development and fielding of 
the Stryker.  The experience the PEO organization gained in establishing the Stryker 
test program was critical to the success of FCS.   The other enabler of the 
development of the FCS’s test strategy and test organization was the relationship 
between the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command and the PEO GCS.  Stryker was 
truly a collaborative effort from day one, and it was obvious to all involved that FCS 
presented an even greater challenge. Thus, the relationship between tester and 
material developer had to be taken to the next level.  
Early in the summer of 2002, a meeting of program officials and leaders of the 
test community met—both to discuss the lessons learned from on-going Stryker 
testing and to put in motion the foundation for FCS testing.  That session catalyzed 
the idea for a Combined Test Organization to be organized within the PM FCS 
program office but located at the Army’s major test center, Aberdeen, Maryland.  
This forum also made the decision to place a seasoned, senior executive service 
from the test community in charge of the organization.  The current organizational 
structure is shown below. 























Figure 3. Combined Test Organization 
(Combined Test Organization, 2006) 
As the organizational chart depicts, the FCS CTO represents all of the 
stakeholders of the program, including a supporting relationship with Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation.   
From day one of the FCS test program, the challenge was not only how to 
effectively and economically test the piece parts, but more importantly, how to fulfill 
the system-of-systems requirements.  The CTO, through its organizational structure 
and its collaborative development of a detailed Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP) (over 1500 pages in length), has allowed the FCS program to execute its 
test strategy of "’Plan Together, Test Once, and Share the Data’ by executing 
collaboratively across the government, the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI), and 
industry partners” (Combined Test Organization, 2006, April 7, pp. 2-5).  
To date, testing throughout the entire FCS program is very successful.  For 
example, the restructuring of the program (which began in 2004) to bring FCS 
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technologies into the current force by 2010 is on track.  In just a little over two years 
(at Fort Bliss, Texas), the program successfully conducted the first experiment to 
determine the readiness of the technologies and the applicability of the capabilities 
to the current force.  Since the experiment was a live-fire exercise, the CTO had to 
ensure and certify that over 5 million lines of code integrated into several prototype 
systems were safe for use and also that instrumentation and trained personnel were 
in place to do the evaluation (Army News Service, 2007, February 2).  The upfront 
focus on testing by the leaders of the FCS program, both government and LSI, and 
their strategic partners of the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command and the 
Training and Doctrine Command will continue to pay dividends throughout the entire 
life of the program.  Testing is truly a team sport!  
Lessons Learned 
(1) As with all other acquisition processes, testing of complex 21st-
century programs requires a much higher level of collaboration 
among all stakeholders than did those systems developed in the 
20th Century. Systems are more complex because of the 
combination of advanced electronics and millions of lines of 
software code.  Additionally, they are expected to operate in an 
integrated network environment.  The only solution to testing 
effectively and economically is to ensure a much higher degree of 
teaming between developers (both government and contractor) 
and testers.   
(2) There is no cookie-cutter approach to testing.  The test strategy 
needs to be tailored to the program’s requirements and to be 
implemented by an integrated organization dedicated to the test 
mission.   
(3) Finally, test strategy and test planning require as much attention 
early in the program as the development of program requirements 
and costs.  It is the author’s experience that many program 
managers leave testing to the quality and assurance directorate 
within the program shop.  Testing is a leader’s responsibility. 
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Conclusion 
The days are over when commanders are willing to make things work “on the 
fly.”  Twenty-first-century warfighting capabilities are required to be joint, integrated 
throughout the battle space, and seamlessly networked. These requirements bring a 
great degree of complexity to the development and fielding of those capabilities.  
Acquisition leaders need to be innovative and adaptive when constructing programs 
that can deliver within cost, schedule, and provide required performance.  Cookie-
cutter approaches to everything from contractual arrangements through logistics 
support will not work. 
The FCS requirement challenged Army acquisition professionals to think 
outside of the box; yet, they were forced to use the tools available to them to create 
an acquisition and management strategy to deliver a highly integrated system-of-
systems. By leveraging lessons learned and working closely with the warfighting 
community, the acquisition leaders of FCS initiated a unique contractual 
arrangement with a Lead Systems Integrator, a program management organization 
based on tenets developed by all parties, and a test organization designed to 
validate the performance of individual components, systems, and, ultimately, the 
system-of-systems. 
Understandably, the focus on FCS (to date) has been on program complexity, 
overall cost, and the concept of having a LSI.  Why?  It is different and more 
challenging than any other acquisition program.  However, the early successes 
within the program and the agility it has demonstrated by staying on course through 
two restructures and significant Congressional decrements within 4 years should 
cause all to ask, “What is right about FCS?” 
This paper attempted to shed light on certain aspects of the program that are 
proving themselves every day.  It is now time to understand why FCS, although 
different, is on cost, on schedule, and, validated by early testing, on track to provide 
21st-century warfighting capabilities.    
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